Russia’s growing diplomatic and security engagement with African countries is yet to translate into significant economic benefits and reliable security partnerships, raising questions about Moscow’s ability to achieve its ambitions on the continent.
Martin Minns, Co-Executive Producer of the Pan-Africa podcast Panel 54, said Russia’s economic contribution to Africa remained limited compared with those of the United States, Europe and China, while its security interventions had produced uneven results.
Minns made the observations in an analysis titled, Can Russia Reach the Summit of Its Ambitions in Africa?, following the third Russia-Africa Summit held in Moscow on October 28 and 29.
The summit, initially scheduled to take place in Libya, brought together 22 African heads of state, according to the Kremlin.
Although the figure represented an increase from the 17 leaders who attended the second summit in St Petersburg in 2023, it was significantly lower than the 43 leaders who participated in the inaugural edition in Sochi in 2019.
The Kremlin attributed the lower attendance to what it described as ‘outrageous’ Western pressure, a position Minns said might have some merit, although he questioned the characterisation of the alleged pressure.
He, however, argued that focusing on attendance figures missed the more important questions about what African countries had gained from the diplomatic gatherings and whether the engagements had produced sustainable partnerships.
According to Minns, Russia’s interest in Africa is driven by its desire to counter Western influence, establish non-aligned partnerships, secure access to mineral resources and expand its defence exports.
However, he said Moscow’s ability to achieve these objectives was constrained by its limited economic investment, declining arms exports and the resources required to sustain its military involvement in Africa.
Citing investment figures, Minns said Russian investments accounted for less than one per cent of direct investment into Africa, far below the contributions of major economic partners such as the United States, Europe and China.
He also noted that Russia’s global arms exports declined by 64 per cent between 2021 and 2025, leaving it ranked third behind the United States and China in major arms supplies to Africa during the period.
On security, Minns said Russia’s increased involvement in the Sahel had not translated into dependable security guarantees for countries in the region.
He cited figures showing that annual deaths linked to violent extremism in the Sahel rose from an average of 927 between 2016 and 2019 to 10,470 between 2022 and 2025.
The development, he said, raised questions about the effectiveness of Russia’s security partnerships, particularly as Moscow continued to face pressure to sustain its commitments while fighting the war in Ukraine.
Minns noted that the conflict had resulted in more than 1.2 million casualties, stretching Russia’s military and diplomatic resources and limiting its capacity to fulfil commitments outside Europe.
He also identified the recruitment of African nationals into the Russian military as another factor undermining Moscow’s image across the continent.
Citing a 2024–2025 Afrobarometer survey conducted across 38 African countries, Minns said perceptions of Russian influence were less favourable than those of the United States, European Union and China.
The survey found that 72 per cent of respondents who had heard about the Russia-Ukraine war wanted their countries to remain neutral in the conflict.
He further cited an October 2026 report by the Hague-based group Journalists for Justice, titled, The Death Contract: How Russia Recruits Africans to Fight and Die in Ukraine, which documented 3,034 African citizens from 40 countries recruited into the Russian armed forces, often through deception and promises of civilian employment.
The concerns had prompted some African governments to seek assurances from Moscow.
At the third Russia-Africa Summit, Kenyan President William Ruto secured an agreement with Russian President Vladimir Putin to designate Kenya a non-source country for recruitment into the Russian military.
Ruto also announced the appointment of a defence attaché at Kenya’s embassy in Moscow to coordinate the repatriation and compensation of Kenyans recruited for military purposes.
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Similarly, Ghana’s President John Dramani Mahama raised the recruitment of Ghanaian nationals with Putin, following which Ghana’s Foreign Ministry announced that the Russian president had declared that Ghanaians would no longer be allowed to participate in the war with Ukraine, including through voluntary enlistment.
Minns said the agreements were welcome developments but their effectiveness would depend on implementation and the ability of governments to prevent recruiters from exploiting alternative channels.
He also referred to reports by Bloomberg indicating that Moscow was expanding its recruitment activities into other African countries, including Zimbabwe, Burundi and Sierra Leone.
Beyond the recruitment concerns, Minns said the broader pattern of African engagement with Russia could best be understood as ‘diversified non-alignment’.
He explained that African governments increasingly viewed Moscow as one of several international partners through which they could pursue their economic, security and diplomatic interests, rather than an exclusive strategic ally.
According to him, African countries were seeking opportunities to strengthen trade, improve security cooperation and secure greater representation in international institutions while maintaining relationships with other global powers.
He said Russia’s limited capacity in trade, arms supplies and diplomatic influence, particularly because of the continuing war in Ukraine, raised questions about its ability to turn political declarations into concrete commitments.
Minns argued that the real test of the Moscow summit would not be the diplomatic statements made during the gathering but the extent to which the agreements translated into measurable benefits for African countries.
He said Russia’s future standing on the continent would depend on its ability to deliver sustained economic benefits, dependable security partnerships and tangible development outcomes.
‘A summit in Moscow gives some idea as to the scale of Russia’s ambitions; it’s what follows that will reveal how far it can realistically meet them,’ Minns said, adding: ‘As they say: talk is cheap.’
